

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1748

EXDIS/SALT

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: U.S. BRIEFING AND NAC DISCUSSION OF MARCH 29 ON
TALKS IN MOSCOW

FOR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON FROM RUMSFELD

I THINK YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF THE
PORTION ON SALT AND RELATED MATTERS OF THE U.S. BRIEFING AND
COUNCIL DISCUSSION MARCH 29 ON SECRETARY'S RECENT TALKS IN
MOSCOW.

BEGIN SUMMARY: COUNSELOR SONNEFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HARTMAN CONSULTED WITH ALLIES IN RESTRICTED NAC SESSION MARCH
29 ABOUT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, REVIEWING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ITEM BY ITEM.

ON SALT, WHICH WAS A LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT PART OF THE
MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS, SOVIETS INDICATED SOME WILLINGNESS TO MOVE
FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION OF EQUAL PROPORTIONS OF MIRV LAUNCHERS
TO SETTING NUMERICAL LIMITS ON MIRV LAUNCHERS. SOVIETS ALSO SHOWED
INTEREST IN EXTENDING INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT. NO BREAKTHROUGH
WAS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD PUT U.S. AND SOVIETS CLEARLY
ON ROAD TO AGREEMENT.

ALLIES APPRECIATED TIMELINESS AND DEPTH OF U.S. PRESENTATION.
THEIR QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS RANGED FROM THE GENERAL--ON
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WHERE CURRENT EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS WERE HEADING--TO THE
SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF U.S. AND SOVIET SALT POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SYG PANSA RECALLED THAT U.S. HAD ALREADY BRIEFED

NAC ON OBJECTIVES OF VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND SAID MEMBERS APPRECIATED FACT THAT SECRETARY WAS SENDING HIS CLOSE AIDS BACK SO PROMPTLY TO INFORM NAC OF RESULTS.

2. IN GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, SONNEFELDT SAID RECORDS OF TALKS WITH SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO BE FULLY ANALYZED TO INSURE THAT ALL NUANCES HAVE BEEN CAUGHT, AND THAT CONTEXT IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THUS, U.S. PERCEPTIONS ARE "SOMEWHAT PRELIMINARY". SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS NOT YET SEEN THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN REPORTING TO HIM BY TELEGRAM EACH DAY. IN A SENSE, ALLIES WERE GETTING AN ADVANCE REPORT; IF THERE WAS ANYTHING TO ADD LATER, WE WOULD OF COURSE DO SO.

3. AS EXPLAINED AT EARLY MARCH PREVIEW OF TRIP, SONNENFELDT SAID TALKS WERE PREPARATORY, AND WERE NOT INTENDED TO BE CONCLUSIVE; THIS WAS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN PREPARING FOR SUMMIT MEETINGS. U.S. SIDE HAD HAD 20 HOURS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, WHO WAS GENERALLY ACCOMPANIED BY AIDES MENTIONED IN COMMUNIQUE. TALKS GENERALLY WERE MORE DISCIPLINED AND SYSTEMATIC THAN IN THE PAST. THERE WAS ONLY ONE MAJOR DIVATION FROM SCHEDULE, ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, WHEN SOVIETS HAD CALLED POLITBURO MEETING WHEN MARSHALL GRECHKO HAD RETURNED PREMATURELY FROM VISIT TO IRAQ. SUCH CHANGES IN SCHEDULE WERE NOT UNUSUAL, HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN INTENDED THAT SOME OF THE MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD AT POLITBOURO HUNTING LODGE. INSTEAD MEETINGS WERE HELD IN KREMLIN, EVIDENTLY BECAUSE OF INCONVENIENCES CAUSE BY RUSSIAN WEATHER.

4. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT SALT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A PROLONGED AND DIFFICULT CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW. ON A SUBJECT OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE COUNCIL, FBS HAD NOT COME UP IN ANY MAJOR WAY ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV HAD PRODUCED A DETAILED AND RATHER ACCURATE MAP OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE WITH SUFFICIENT RANGE TO HIT THE U.S.S. R. BREZHNEV HAD SAID THAT THIS WOULD AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT A PERMANENT SALT AGREEMENT MIGHT NOT BE ATTAINABLE IN 1974. THE U.S. WAS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THAT, SONNEFELDT SAID.

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5. THE DISCUSSIONS ALSO COVERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT BE EXTENDED AND, IN THAT CONTEXT, TO DEAL WITH MIRV BREZHNEV APPEARED TO BACK AWAY FROM SOVIET APPROACH OF LAST OCTOBER WHICH FAVORED EQUAL PROPORTION OF MIRV LAUNCHERS. INSTEAD OF EQUAL PROPORTIONS, THE SOVIETS SEEMED WILLING TO SET LIMITS ON MIRV LAUNCHER

ABSOLUTE NUMBERS, BUT WERE NOT CLEAR ON WHAT NUMBERS.

6. THE PROBLEM IS THAT SOVIET SLBM/MIRVS ARE AT AN EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. MIRVED SLBMS COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED UNTIL LATE IN THE EXTENDED PERIOD. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS COULD FILL THEIR QUOTA WITH MIRVED ICBMS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE THROW WEIGHT AND POSSIBLE NUMBER OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES IN THE PAYLOAD OF SOVIET ICBM

SUCH A DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVED ICBMS COULD POSE A THREAT TO U.S. LAND BASED MISSILE FORCES IN THE TIME FRAME OF AN EXTENDED INTERIM AGREEMENT.

7. SOVIETS WERE NOT WILLING TO CONSIDER A CEILING ON MIRVED ICBMS. IN FACT, THE TERMS "CEILING" AND "SUBCEILING" PROVED CONTROVERSIAL WHENEVER IT WAS INTRODUCED. SONNELFELDT REMARKED THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM IS VERIFICATION. ONCE MIRVS ARE INTRODUCED, WE WOULD HAVE TO COUNT ALL SYSTEMS AS MIRVED AND WE WOULD NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER. BREZHNEV WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CONSIDER THIS ASPECT.

8. IN SUM, THERE WAS NO BREAKTHROUGH WHICH WOULD PUT US ON THE ROAD TO AGREEMENT. SOVIET SHIFT FROM PROPORTIONS TO NUMBERS HOLDS SOME ENCOURAGEMENT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT A SIMILAR APPROACH BY BOTH SIDES.

9. DISCUSSIONS WILL CONTINUE, IN GENEVA, IN BILATERAL CHANNELS IN WASHINGTON AND PROBABLY WITH BROMYKO IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL, WHEN HE COMES TO THE U.S. FOR THE UNGA. AFTER THIS THE U.S. CAN DETERMINE WHETHER ANOTHER TRIP BY THE SECRETARY TO MOSCOW WOULD BE USEFUL.

10. THE SOVIETS RAISED A NUMBER OF OTHER DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. THERE WERE INTERESTED PARTICULARLY IN THE FOLLOWING: CW BAN ON PRODUCTION AND USE--U.S. SIDE POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTIES WITH VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY OF PRODUCTION. PROSPECTS FOR VERIFYING
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CW USE MAY BE SOMEWHAT BETTER. U.S. SEES DIFFICULTIES MOVING ON THIS SUBJECT.

11. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN--U.S. AGAIN POINTED OUT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WITH COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. SOVIETS HAD IDEA OF MAKING AGREEMENT EFFECTIVE SOMETIME AHEAD. SONNEFLEDT COMMENTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE POLITICAL REASONS FOR THE SOVIET INTEREST IN A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY THOUGHT THERE WERE SOME WHO COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE TO SUCH A BAN. U.S. SIDE HAD SAID WE COULD NOT ENGAGE IN EFFORTS TO PRESSURE OTHERS WHO WERE TESTING.

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12. DENUCLEARIZATION OF MEDITERRANEAN FLEETS--IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION IT APPEARED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE POSING THIS AS AN FBS KIND OF PROBLE. U.S. SIDE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. FLEET'S ROLE INVOLVED OTHER MISSIONS. THUS ANY MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE IN A BROAD CONTEXT. THE U.S. SIDE HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS NO REASON TO THINK THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN THIS.

13. ENVIRONMENT--SOVIETS SUGGESTED AN AGREEMENT NOT TO MODIFY THE ENVIRONMENT IN A WAY DELETERIOUS TO HUMAN LIFE. U.S. AGREED TO HAVE EXPERTS LOOK INTO THE FOREGOING SUGGESTION.

14. SONNENFELDT SAID OVERALL TONE OF THE TALKS WAS MODERATE AND INFORMAL, ALTHOUGH DISAGREEMENTS AND COMPLAINTS WERE FORCEFULLY STATED.

THERE WERE NO DRAMATICS. IN SUM, WHILE THE SALT DISCUSSIONS--THE MOST IMPORTANT FROM THE U. S. STANDPOINT--ARE AT THIS STATE INCONCLUSIVE, THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT AND THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO FAILURE. THERE ARE SOME PROSPECTS IN THE AREA OF BILATERAL ISSUES AND THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME MOVEMENT IN CSCE. THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE WAS SOBER BUT POSITIVE.

15. SONNENFELDT BELIEVED BREZHNEV WAS IN FULL AUTHORITY. WHILE HE HAD A NUMBER OF PAPERS IN FRONT OF HIM AND APPEARED TO BE FOLLOWING THEM, THIS MAY HAVE ONLY BEEN TO ENSURE THAT HE DID NOT OMIT IMPORTANT POINTS. SONNEFELDT ALSO BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT IMPORTANT POSITION PAPERS WERE APPROVED BY THE POLITBURO. SPECIFIC-
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ALLY ON SALT, BREZHNEV PROBABLY CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE ADVICE OF HIS DEFENSE ADVISERS, AND BREZHNEV MADE REFERENCE TO HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE COUNCIL.

16. STILL, BREZHNEV MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF BEING THE HEAD OF A COALITION, WHICH REQUIRED THE BALANCING OF INTEREST GROUPS. BREZHNEV WAS A SKILLED POLITICIAN; WHILE HE ACTED UNDER CONSTRAINTS HE ALSO ACTED WITH AUTHORITY. HE WAS TREATED WITH RESPECT AND EVEN REVERENCE, BUT IN A SPIRIT OF COLLEGIALLY, EVEN WITH LOWER RANKING PERSONS.

17. FRENCH PERMREP DE FORSE REFERRED TO THE SOVIET "PHOBIA" ABOUT CEILINGS IN SALT, AND ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY PROGRESS TOWARD SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE", THE BASIS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL ALSO, DID THE SOVIETS SEEM PREOCCUPIED ABOUT CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES? HAD THE SOVIETS SAID THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE MUST BE INCLUDED IN SALT? AS TO THE QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF LIMITATIONS, THE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND THE U.S.

AS REGARDS MIRVING SLBMS. WHY THEN WERE THE SOVIETS SEEKING AGREEMENT TO UNDERGROUND TEST BANS, WHICH COULD AFFECT THAT. FINALLY, COULD ONE ENVISAGE A SALT AGREEMENT COVERING THE ENSEMBLE OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS?

18. SONNENFELDT BELIEVED THE PROBLEM IS NOT WHETHER THE SOVIETS ACCEPT ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE BUT HOW ONE DEFINES THE CONCEPT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WOULD INCLUDE FBS, BUT NOT THEIR OWN NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS SUCH AS BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES THAT WERE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE U.S.

19. SONNENFELDT OBSERVED THAT JUST AS THE U.S. SAW THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS AND THORW-WEIGHT OF LAUNCHERS, THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED U.S. ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES.

20. SONNENFELDT HAD NOT SEEN INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR NEW SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH CHINA. HE DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET PRE-OCCUPATIONS HAD DECLINED. PERHAPS THEY WERE OF OF LESS URGENCY OWING TO THE PRESENT CHINESE INTERNAL SITUATION. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT MENTIONED CHINA MORE THAN ONCE. AT THE SAME TIME, SONNENFELDT ASSUMED THE SOVIETS TOOK CHINESE CAPABILITIES INTO ACCOUNT WHEN CONSIDERING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE.

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21. THE QUESTION OF ALLIED NUCLEAR SUBMARINES DID NOT ARISE, BUT THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY CONSIDERED THEMSELVES PROTECTED AS TO OVERALL NUMBERS OF SLBMS UNTIL 1977.

22. AS TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SONNENFELDT COULD NOT GIVE AN OFF-HAND JUDGMENT OF HOW IMPORTANT UNDERGROUND TESTS WOULD BE FOR SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF MIRVED SLBMS OR ICBMS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF AN EFFECTIVE DATE SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE FOR AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN WHICH MIGHT RELATE TO DE ROSE'S POINT. THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT ACCEPT A TEST BAN THAT PREVENTED THEIR ACHIEVING THE CAPABILITIES THEY WANTED.

23. CONCERNING QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS OTHER THAN MIRVS, THE PROBLEM HERE WAS VERIFICATION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME TALK IN THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY ABOUT LIMITATIONS ON ACCURACY, BUT THESE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO VERIFY. SONNENFELDT CONCLUDED THAT THE ONE MOST PROMISING AREA OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WAS MIRVS, BUT EVEN HERE THE LIMITATION MIGHT BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF NUMBERS, RATHER THAN IN A STRICTLY QUALITATIVE SENSE.

24. ASYG PANSKY ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY SOVIET REACTION TO THE U.S. RETARGETING POLICY. SONNENFELDT SAID NO-, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME PERIPHERAL REFERENCES TO THE NEW U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET.

25. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR MENZIES COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS ON MIRV LAUNCH

ERS. IN HIS SLAT CONCLUTATIONS, AMBASSADOR JOHNSON SPOKE OF
THE U.S. AIM TO ACHIEVE EQUAL THROW-WEITGHT. WAS THE MENTION OF SUB-

CEILINGS A WAY TO EXPLORE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND SOMETHING
ELSE MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN EQUAT THROW-WIGHT? HAD SONNEFELDT PRE-
SENTED SOME FEFNINEMENT OF THE POINT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD EXPLAINED

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26. SONNEFELDT REPLIED THAT FROM THE U.S. STANDPOINT, THE BEST
WAY WOULD BE TO HAVE ROUGHLY EQUAL THROW-WEIGHT OF MIRV LAUNCHERS.
HOWEVER, THIS COULD BE EXPRESSED IN NUMBERS OF THE TYPES OF LAUNCHERS
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INVOLVED. THE RESULT WOULD BE LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBERS OF RE-ENTRY
VEHICLES THAT COULD THREATEN OUR LAND-BASED MISSILES. HOWEVER, THE
TWO SIDES HAD NOT GONE INTO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO FIX LIMITS.
WHEN THE U.S. SPOKE OF CEILINGS, IT WAS ALSO SEEKING TO ENSURE THE
SURVIVABILITY OF ITS MINUTEMAN FORCE.

27. MENZIES THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DISCUSSION OF
SOVIET VIEWS ON SLBMS AS A STABLIIZING ELEMENT OR ANY SOVIET
DISPOSITION TO MOVE MORE OF THEIR CAPABILITY INTO A
SECURE SECOND STRIKE FORCE.

28. IN REPLY TO THE CANADIAN QUESTIION, SONNEFELDT SAID HE
HAD SEEN NO DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS TO MOVE
AWAY FROM FURTHER PROGRESS IN LAND-BASED SYSTEMS. BREZHNEV
HAD INDICATED AT ONE POINT THAT THIS WAS A MATTER THAT WOULD
BE DETERMINED BY DOCTRINE;HOWEVER, SONNENFELDT'S ESTIMATE
WAS THAT IT WAS MORE A QUESTION OF THE STATE OF THEIR PRGRESS.

29. FISCHBAC# (LUXEMBOURG) ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS NO PROSPECT
FOR A SALT AGREEMENT AT THE 1974 SUMMIT. SONNENFLEDT SAID THAT
THE PROSPECTS OF A PERMANENT SALT AGREEMENT IN 1974 WERE DIM
BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER
AGREEMENT OF AN INTERIM NATURE.
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